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This paper reviews the origin and theoretical foundation of the concept Military-
Industrial Complex and explains the key issues involved in the literature on the MIC 
in the Cold war context. It then considers the implications for the MIC of some main 
post-Cold War developments, with particular emphasis on the arms industry, its 
structure and effects. It then assesses the degree to which the end of the Cold War 


























When the size of the military sector in a country and its importance to the economy, 
or indeed its cost to the economy, come under scrutiny the existence of a ‘Military 
Industrial Complex’ (MIC) is often alluded to. In general it is meant to represent the 
groups within society that benefit from military spending and its growth, but what is 
meant by it is often vague and sometimes inconsistent (Fine 1993). Despite being 
most used in critical analyses, the source of the term is more conservative. It was 
introduced by Dwight Eisenhower, an ex-military Republican President of the USA, 
who was concerned about the combined power of the large military establishment and 
the arms industry, which he called the military-industrial complex (Albertson 1963).  
 
This was later developed by social scientists framing it as coalitions of vested interests 
within the state and industry, which could lead to decisions being made which were in 
the interest of the coalition members and not necessarily in the interests of national 
security. These coalitions could include some members of the armed services, of the 
civilian defence bureaucracy, of the legislature, of the arms manufacturers and of their 
workers.  
 
Much of the work on the MIC sees it as a fairly clear and constant feature of the Cold 
War, when in the absence of a ‘hot war’ between the two super powers to test the 
strength of the adversary, it was possible to overemphasize and exaggerate threats to 
justify high levels of military spending. Since the end of the Cold War, there have 
been  profound  changes  in  the  international  security  environment.  World  military 
expenditures began to fall in the late 1980s, at first gradually for a couple of years 
with improving East-West relations, then sharply in 1992 after the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union in 1991. At the same time, the fixed costs of R&D for major systems 
continued  to  grow,  both  for  platforms  and  for  the  infrastructure  (e.g.  satellites, 
strategic  air  assets)  and  the  information-based  systems  needed  to  support 
network-centred warfare. These trends in military expenditures and technology have 
led to considerable changes in the Defence Industrial Base (DIB) and in the relations 
between it, the state and the military. This does mean that the MIC has changed, but it 
does not mean it has disappeared or even become less powerful. 
 
The next section considers the origin and theoretical foundation of the concept MIC. 
It is followed by a review of the actual features of what is generally understood as the 
MIC, as it developed during the Cold War. The chapter then considers what a number 
of  major  developments  in  the  post-Cold  War  period  imply  for  the  MIC,  with 
particular emphasis on the arms industry, its structure and effects. Finally, it assesses 
the degree to which the end of the Cold War has resulted in a fundamental change of 
the MIC and its implications. 
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2. Theorising the Military Industrial Complex 
 
The idea of a MIC in the US was introduced by President Dwight Eisenhower who in 
his 1961 farewell address warned against the potentially strong influence and power 
generated by the ‘conjunction of a immense military establishment and a large arms 
industry’  that  had  been  created  through  the  massive  military  mobilization  during 
World War II, which led him to plead that ‘we must guard against the acquisition of 
unwarranted  influence,  whether  sought  or  unsought,  by  the  military-industrial 
complex.  The  potential  for  the  disastrous  rise  or  misplaced  power  exists  and  will 
persist’ (Eisenhower 1961).   
 
While constituting a potentially important set of economic actors, there have been 
limited attempts by economists to analyse the MIC. As for mainstream economists, 
the  existence  of  an  MIC  is  seen  as  something  of  an  anomaly.  The  neoclassical 
economics approach is based upon the notion of a state with a well defined social 
welfare function, reflecting some form of consensus, recognising some well defined 
national interests, and threatened by some potential enemy/ies. Governments allocate 
military budgets to deal with perceived threats and there is a trade off between ‘guns’ 
and  ‘butter’  (Dunne  and  Coulomb  2009).  This  implies  that  national  governments 
make decisions about the need for defensive and offensive capabilities, decide the best 
way to achieve these in terms of force structures and weapons procurement and then 
decide on the form of DIB required. Thus, for input budgeting and for programme or 
output planning, the problem is seen as finding the most efficient means of producing 
aspects of national security. Ideally, the DIB should then be the most efficient way of 
supporting the production of the optimal level of security (Hartley and Sandler 1995).  
 
One problem with this perspective is that it ignores the political and social dynamics 
of the arms production and procurement systems. The size and importance of the DIB 
within many countries has inevitably led to it linking into other parts of society and 
the economy. Once we move beyond seeing the DIB as a passive capability to provide 
weapon systems and recognise the fact that it may have proactive tendencies (rent 
seeking  and  efforts  to  capture  the  customers/regulators),  these  linkages  become 
important.  More  recent  neoclassical  literature  has  addressed  these  issues  and 
attempted to integrate political factors, such as bargaining and interest groups, which 
determine  sources  of  weapons  and  levels  of  protection.  But  this  still  represents  a 
partial analysis focusing on particular aspects of the process. It does not address the 
complex dialectical interaction between the demand side and the supply side, in which 
both will influence each other and set the parameters for decision making, which can 
be a complex dynamic process that can be both contradictory and conflictual (Dunne 
1995).  
 
More general analyses locate the DIB firmly within the context of the wider MIC and 
relate it to the functioning of the capitalist economic system. The MIC represents a set 
of interests which might diverge from the interests of capitalism, what Smith (1977) 
characterises as the liberal or institutional perspective. This view hinges on the nature 
of an MIC as composed of conflicting interest groups and institutional linkages. The 
MIC becomes a self generating structure (agency) which embodies the interests of 
various groups in society. The strength of these vested interests and their competition 
for resources leads to internal pressures for military spending, with external threats 
providing the justification. The MIC imposes a burden on the rest of society and has   - 4 - 
adverse  effects  on  the  civilian  sector.  It  crowds  out  civilian  resources,  and  the 
companies involved develop a culture which leads to inefficiency and waste and an 
increasing reliance on defence contracts as they become less able to compete in the 
civilian market (Dumas 1986; Melman 1985). The theoretical underpinnings of this 
approach were originally based on C Wright Mill's analysis of the power elite (Mills 
1956),  but  there  are  also  variants,  which  follow  a  Weberian  focus  on  the  role  of 
bureaucracy and the work of John Kenneth Galbraith on coalitions (Slater and Nardin 
1973) and, in the US context, the work of Veblen on the importance of the military 
‘waste’  to  the  ideological  and  institutional  structure  of  the  US  economy  (Cypher 
2008).  
 
There is also a considerable amount of work undertaken from a Marxist perspective. 
While this approach is often typified as focussing on a ruling class concept of the MIC 
(Brunton 1988), it is more varied than this suggests. The role of military expenditure 
in the development of capitalism is seen as wider and more pervasive than in the 
institutional approach, but with the MIC constrained by the laws of motion of the 
capitalist system. Within the Marxist approach there are a number of strands which 
tend to differ in their treatment of crisis and in the extent to which they see military 
expenditure as necessary for capital accumulation (Dunne 1990).  
 
The underconsumptionist approach developed from the work of Baran and Sweezy 
(1966)  sees  military  spending  as  important  in  preventing  realisation  crises  (crises 
caused by difficulties in selling products due to deficient demand, which means that 
profits cannot be realised). Unlike other forms of government spending, it allows the 
absorption of surplus without increasing wages, and so maintains profits. In this way 
the MIC provides a valuable service to maintaining capitalism. A similar perspective 
focuses  on  the  tendency  for  capitalist  economies  to  overproduce.  In  this  theory, 
military  expenditure  is  wasteful  and  the  allocation  of  resources  into  it  prevents 
overheating. Thus the inefficiencies of the MIC and the DIB play a positive role in 
capitalist development creating the ‘permanent arms economy’ (Howard and King 
1992).  Empirical  work,  starting  with  Smith  (1977),  has,  however,  failed  to  find 
support  for  the  underconsumptionist  approach  and  its  prediction  of  a  positive 
economic effect of military spending (Smith and Dunne 1994).  
 
This overview shows that there is no clear theoretical conceptualisation of the MIC. 
Indeed,  the  concept  appears  to  be  of  most  value  as  a  descriptive  rather  than  an 
analytical  concept  (Fine  1993).  This  has  led  some  researchers  to  focus  on  the 
dynamics of the MIC at an empirical level. Smith and Smith (1983) argue that the 
MIC should be seen as a coalition of interests and that the focus should be on the 
structural pairings that have developed between particular sections of private industry 
and particular parts of the military, which have inevitably led to mutual interests. In 
contrast, Brunton (1988) argues that the MIC should be seen as an evolving system of 
institutions rather than focusing on individual components. While the MIC is not a 
clear theoretical concept, it is apparent that there is a MIC that can influence policy on 
military spending. There are some similarities with other ‘industrial complexes’ in 
areas such as health and education, but there are important differences in detail, in 
particular the fact that the arms industry produces the means of violence.  
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3. The Cold War Military-Industrial Complex 
 
When Eisenhower referred to the unwarranted influence of the MIC, he was focusing 
on  something  historically  specific.  In  the  past  there  had  been  large  US  and 
international  defence  companies  but  their  size  and  their  relations  with  the  state 
differed markedly. During the First World War, arms production was largely dealt 
with by Government arsenals and until the beginning of the Second World War there 
was  no  real  national  planning  for  defence  and  so  no  dependence  of  major  US 
companies on military spending. The coming of the New Deal in the 1930’s had led to 
federal government taking on more roles and responsibility and to the use of national 
economic planning for economic and military security (Schwartz, 1990). The start of 
the Second World War spurred unprecedented technological innovations and created 
huge  demand  for  industry.  Industry,  universities  and  the  military  were  linked  and 
huge  government  funded  R&D  efforts  led  to  patents  which  were  then  given  to 
companies,  with  aircraft  and  electronics  production  given  special  status.  This 
represented a fundamental change in attitudes and at the end of the war procurement 
cuts led to this new defence industry lobbying for arms procurement to maintain its 
size. The fall of the ‘iron curtain’ answered their calls, with the Soviet Union threat 
requiring the maintenance of a permanent army and a permanent defence industry to 
protect US interests. The Soviet nuclear explosion of 1949, the Communist take-over 
in China in the same year, and the Korean War (1951-1953) contributed to halting the 
downward trend of US military spending and set the scene for the development of a 
mature MIC (Chapman and Yudken 1992, 2).  
 
A number of developments assisted the new defence industry. A new Department of 
Defense (DoD) in the US in 1947 introduced civilians into the defence bureaucracy, 
particularly in the aftermath of the New Deal, and changed the focus of concern from 
purely military ones to the attendant economic  impacts of changes in the defence 
budget, the standing army and the defence industry (Schwarz 1990). The management 
of the DOD was no longer only in the hands of military personnel, but also corporate 
executives, who provided what was seen as important expertise, by moving from their 
companies  through  a  ‘revolving  door’  that  would  see  them  work  in  the  Pentagon 
before going back to their companies. In 1961 McNamara left the presidency of the 
Ford Motor Company to become Secretary of Defence, to bring modern corporate 
techniques  to  the  conduct  of  military  affairs.  In  addition,  the  Cold  War  saw  the 
continued  development  of  links  between  universities  and  the  military,  with  the 
Pentagon becoming an important source of funds for research (Chapman and Yudken 
1992, 3; Giroux 2007). 
 
Within the military there had been  a number of important changes in  the Second 
World War. The increasing importance of advanced technology, particularly in the 
new aerospace industry, saw the need for the military to engage with industry. The 
professionalization of the forces, moving to volunteer armies, with a standing army in 
peacetime led to unforeseen problems. In wartime, military officer‘s status and rank 
are generally gained through military achievement, but in peace time it is more likely 
to be by pleasing superiors and advancing weapons systems and programmes. There 
are  numerous  examples  of  how  such  careerism  in  the  military  services  led  to 
continued support for unsuccessful systems, tied in with the interests of particular 
officers  involved  in  procurement  with  particular  contractors  and  even  government 
officials  (Chapman  and  Yudken  1992).  Examples  also  abound  of  troops  being   - 6 - 
provided  with  expensive  and  poor  equipment,  when  better  alternatives  existed,  as 
Page (2006) illustrates for the UK. In addition, inter service rivalry led to some less 
than sensible decisions on procurement of weapons systems (Chapman and Yudken 
1992, 5-10). A technological arms race erupted from the standoff with the Soviet 
Union and the DoD’s increasing budgets were justified by alleged capability ‘gaps’ in 
missiles,  bombers,  warheads  and  a  general  over  representation  of  Soviet  military 
prowess –all of which are now known to have been illusory (Chapman and Yudken 
1992). 
 
Within  this  Cold  War  context,  the  national  governments  were  clearly  the  main 
customers of the defence companies and this meant that the arms market evolved into 
a monopsonistic structure, a market with one dominant customer and a number of 
suppliers. This was bound to influence the behaviour of the firms as they moved from 
being more general manufacturers to become defence specialists, because of the high 
potential  returns,  and  started  to  become  experts  at  getting  money  out  of  the 
government rather than competing in the market. They had to deal with the elaborate 
rules and regulations on contracts, that were needed to compensate for the absence of 
any form of competitive market and to assure public accountability. The ‘revolving 
door’  facilitated  linkages,  with  military  personnel  and  civil  servants  moving  to 
defence contractors they had had dealings with and staff from defence contractors 
moving into the bureaucracy (Adams 1981; Higgs 1990). 
 
Companies sought involvement in the development programmes for technologically 
advanced weapons systems as the best means of obtaining the subsequent production 
contracts. This led to ‘buy ins’, where firms understated risk or cost to win initial 
contracts, with a view to making up the losses later. They could rely on risk being 
borne  by  government,  which  often  financed  R&D  and  in  some  cases  provided 
investment in capital and infrastructure.  This led to an emphasis on performance 
rather than on cost of high-technology military systems, with more concern with how 
good it sounded than whether it worked. Early versions of cruise missiles are a case in 
point.  In  addition,  programmes  saw  ‘gold  plating’,  where  the  military  continually 
requested extras or continuous technological improvements over the contract period, 
so  allowing  renegotiation  of  contracts  or  additional  payments,  usually  to  the 
advantage of the contractor (Dunne 1995).  
 
Operating within a market with these peculiar characteristics was bound to influence 
the nature of the companies and this led to both barriers to entry and to exit. Market, 
technological  and  procedural  barriers,  meant  that  not  only  was  it  difficult  for 
companies to enter into the defence sector to produce weapons systems, or to upgrade 
from subcontractor status, but also that it was difficult for the defence companies to 
leave the industry. Thus the Cold War DIB showed remarkably stability in terms of its 
composition  of  main  contractors.  In  most  countries  the  main  contractors  had  a 
monopoly  or  near-monopoly  position  and  in  many  cases  were  state  owned.  Such 
markets  structures,  combined  with  high  military  spending,  lobbying,  regional 
dependence, limited transparency and oversight, created incentive structures that led 
to high weapons costs, corruption and inefficiencies within the arms producers  that 
were  argued  to  have  externality  effects  on  civil  industry  (Dumas  1986;  Melman 
1985). 
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These conditions and processes make up what is commonly referred to as the MIC – a 
powerful  set  of  actors  with  vested  interests  in  high  military  spending  that  in  the 
specific ideology of the Cold War could marshal resources to pursue their particular 
interests.  
 
Much of the discussion about the constitution, mechanisms, processes and behaviour 
of  the  MIC  refers  to  the  particular  US  situation.  In  Europe  things  were  rather 
different, with state ownership, more direct state involvement in the arms industry and 
much smaller domestic defence markets. Some have argued, however, that the basis 
for a form of MIC with similar dynamics could be identified in the UK and other 
countries (Dunne 1995; Lovering 1990). 
 
 
4. Post Cold War Developments  
 
Since the end of the cold war, there have been a number of developments that have 
had implications for the nature of the MIC. Certainly, the end of the Cold War saw 
profound  changes  in  the  international  security  environment.  World  military 
expenditures peaked in the late 1980s, fell gradually between 1989 and 1990 with 
improving East-West relations, then dropped sharply in 1992 after the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union in 1991. The international arms trade dropped by a half between 
the 1982 all-time high and the 1995 trough, has then fluctuated somewhat until it 
began  to  increase  consistently  in  2003  (The  SIPRI  Arms  Transfers  Database). 
Procurement of weapons also fell sharply, with SIPRI (Sköns and Weidacher 2000) 
estimating that arms production (domestic demand plus exports minus imports) in 
1997 was 56% of its 1987 level in the US, 78% in France and 90% in the UK. These 
changes  had  a  direct  impact  on  the  demand  for  the  products  of  the  MIC  and  the 
environment in which they operate, calling into question the ability of even the major 
countries to maintain a comprehensive domestic defence industrial base. Governments 
found it harder to justify previous levels of support for the industry and 'competitive 
procurement  policies  aimed  at  value  for  money  were  introduced  in  a  number  of 
countries’ (Dunne and Macdonald 2002).  
 
In the US, however, there have been developments that went against this trend and 
had  important  impacts  on  the  US  military  establishment  and  arms  industry.  Most 
importantly, while there was an initial period of military expenditure cuts and arms 
industry downsizing, military spending began to grow again in 1999 and has increased 
rapidly since 2001, due to the massive spending made possible under the ‘global war 
on terror’ label (Sköns Chapter in this volume) and justified primarily with the wars in 
Afghanistan  and  Iraq.  Contrary  to  previous  US  funding  practice,  these  wars  were 
funded  through  supplemental  appropriations  outside  the  regular  annual  defence 
budget requests. This was not only for the initial period, when it might be justified by 
the fact that war costs are difficult to predict, but continuously for 5-6 years, with 
some  correction  only  after  repeated  critical  reviews  by  the  US  Government 
Accountability Office (GAO 2008) and requests from Congress. This practice had two 
important  implications:  it  produced  an  overly  optimistic  picture  of  the  funding 
requirement for the war and reduced the level of legislative oversight, since requests 
for supplemental appropriations go through a less comprehensive process than regular 
defence budget requests (Kosiak 2008, 48-49). In addition, the scope of what could be 
included in the supplemental was successively increased by the Bush Administration   - 8 - 
not  only  to  cover  incremental  costs  directly  related  to  operations,  as  traditionally 
would  have  been  the  case,  but  also  to  cover  the  cost  of  other  programmes  and 
activities that were, at best, only indirectly related to the wars. In 2006, new DoD 
guidance for war appropriation requests made it possible for the armed services to 
include virtually  anything in their requests for  war-related appropriations. (Kosiak 
2008, 53). This is likely to have reinforced linkages between the military and the arms 
industry, since it provided scope for adding on non-war related items in a rapidly 
expanding defence budget (Sköns Chapter in this volume). In addition, Congress was 
criticized for becoming a spectator rather than a check on Presidential power, with 
some  members  supporting  crucial  decisions  to  direct  war  funding  to  their  home 
districts. In 2002 Congress abandoned its duty to deliberate a declaration of war on 
Iraq and handed the administration a blank cheque (Wheeler , 2004). 
 
In addition to the changes in the levels of demand for arms, new technologies have 
enabled new types of warfare and changed the nature of the demand. Communication 
and control technologies have become increasingly important in the theatre of military 
operations. Network-centred warfare, the use of satellites, communications equipment 
and multi-node networks changed the nature of demand -part of the Revolution in 
Military  Affairs  (RMA),  a  term  used  to  emphasise  the  way  that  improvements  in 
information  technology,  precision  targeting  and  smart  munitions  created  the 
possibility of a new form of warfare, network-centred warfare. The internet came to 
play an important role in the development of communications, but it also provides a 
further area of potential security threats. While it is unlikely that the US and Europe 
(NATO) will face an enemy that can provide a symmetric response, this is unlikely to 
stop arguments that other countries, such as China, may well do so in future. For now, 
the most likely strategic concerns will be with more informal guerrilla-type conflicts, 
with different implications for weapons systems required (Dunne et al 2006). This 
uncertainty about the enemy and the growth of ‘homeland security’ are also adding on 
new types of demand. In particular they are making communications and surveillance 
technologies increasingly important (Smith 2009). 
 
NATO and EU troops are also increasingly involved in peacekeeping roles around the 
world.  Apart  from  changing  the  nature  and  structure  of  the  forces,  and  possibly 
creating somewhat different military systems requirements (although some successful 
lobbying to maintain the use of systems already in production has taken place), it will 
require interoperability between armed forces from different countries and therefore 
greater  harmonisation  in  military  systems,  in  particular  for  information  and 
communication. NATO enlargement has also required countries joining the alliance to 
replace  old  and  Warsaw  Pact  systems  with  new  US  and  European  ones  and  has, 
consequently, increased demand. 
 
On  the  supply  side  there  were  a  number  of  important  developments  including 
increased  concentration,  technological  change,  subcontracting  and 
internationalisation.  The  end  of  the  Cold  War  did  not  bring  about  the  expected 
diversification of the defence industry. Instead there was a rapid process of ownership 
concentration  through  mergers  and  acquisitions.    In  the  US  there  was  a  striking 
change in industrial policy. During the Cold War industrial planning was undertaken 
through the Pentagon, but this was only an implicit industrial planning (Markusen and 
Yudken 1992, 51-55). In 1993 a merger wave was stimulated by the ‘last supper’ 
when Pentagon Deputy Secretary, William Perry, told a dinner of defence industry   - 9 - 
executives  that  they  were  expected  to  start  merging.  It  ended  when  the  Pentagon 
decided it had gone far enough and blocked the merger of Lockheed Martin with 
Northrop  Grumman  in  early  1997  (Page  1999,  213-214).  This  left  four  major 
contractors  and  the  only  major  change  since  then  was  the  takeover  by  Northrop 
Grumman of the aerospace and information technology company TRW, making them 
the third-largest US arms producer after Lockheed Martin and Boeing (SIPRI 2002). 
This led to a massive increase in the size of the major defence companies, which is 
also likely to lead to an increase in their power. To the extent that it also resulted in an 
increased specialization on defence, as argued by Markusen and Costigan (1999), it is 
also  led  to  an  increased  interest  in  lobbying  for  major  defence  contracts.  In  an 
environment of growing budgets this could mean further growth in the size of the 
industry,  as  well  as  its  dependence  on  the  domestic  arms  market,  more  efforts  to 
influence government decisions, including more pork barrelling. 
 
The increased fixed costs in production that assisted industrial restructuring also led to 
arms  producers  resorting  to  commercially  available  civilian  technologies  and 
products. This was a marked change, as from the end of World War II to the 1980s 
military technology had tended to be in advance of civilian technology, but by the 
1990s in many areas, particularly electronics, military technology lagged the civilian 
sector. This was largely because the long lead-times involved in military procurement 
meant that much of the technology was obsolete before the system came into service 
(Smith 2009). Whereas in the past the spin-off of military technology to the civilian 
sector was an important argument for the value of military production, now there is 
more spin-in of civilian technology to the military. Many areas of technology which 
were once the preserve of the military and security services, such as cryptography, are 
now dominated by commercial applications. Increased numbers of components that 
go into the major weapons systems are commercial ‘off-the-shelf’ (COTS) products, 
produced by manufacturers who would not see themselves as part of the arms industry 
(Dunne  1995).  This  has  also  meant  that  subcontracting  has  become  increasingly 
important  for  arms  producers  as  they  can  generally  get  components  that  are  not 
defence  specific  at  cheaper  prices  from  the  specialist  producers.  This  means  they 
outsource  work  to  other  companies,  increasing  the  links  with  the  civil  sector  and 
bringing new types of company, particularly from the electronics and IT sectors, into 
the defence industrial base (Dunne et. al., 2007a,b). This means it has become less 
clear which companies benefit from defence contracts, reducing the visibility of the 
defence industrial base has been reduced. Subcontracting has also reduced the degree 
of in house manufacturing for the main arms producers, changing the nature of the 
companies. They have tended to lose some of their direct manufacturing capacity, 
retaining mainly design, R&D and integration skills –in addition to the skills required 
to gain and negotiated contacts with government (Markusen and Costigan, 1999). 
 
Another important factor has been the internationalisation of arms production in the 
post-cold war period. This has taken two forms, the internationalisation of ownership 
and the internationalisation of supply chains. Although defence companies still rely 
on domestic support through procurement and support for exports, governments have 
been increasingly willing to recognise that the costs of high-technology research and 
development  when  combined  with  smaller  national  production  runs  have  made  it 
more necessary to make economies of scale through international collaboration and 
industrial restructuring. This has led to marked increases in cross border mergers and 
acquisitions  and  cross  ownerships  in  the  arms  industry,  with  considerable   - 10 - 
internationalization of the content of advanced weapons systems (Dunne and Surry, 
2006). As early as 1985 the Congressional Defence Joint Oversight Committee on 
Foreign Dependency, found that the guidance system of an air to air missile had 16 
foreign produced parts. Contractors have continued to identify preferred suppliers and 
to use a wider range of them (Dunne, 2006a; Hayward 2001).  
 
Despite the degree of internationalisation it is not clear how much it has changed the 
dynamics within the MIC. Companies appear to remain significantly dependent on the 
government  of  the  country  in  which  they  are  located,  regardless  of  ownership 
relations. International supply chains provide flexibility and potential cost reductions 
for  firms,  but  could  make  them  more  vulnerable  if  they  become  dependent  on 
international subcontractors. They also reduce the visibility of the defence industrial 
base and could lead to governments and workers from other countries being involved 
in lobbying for orders 
 
A major reason for the relative stability of the cold war DIB was the existence of 
barriers to entry and exit. The industry has gone through changes, but barriers to entry 
are likely to remain considerable as the marketing of military products differs from 
commercial products and personal contacts and networking are likely to remain more 
important  than  general  advertising.  Market  demand  for  arms  is  also  limited  by 
government and is likely to be inelastic. This means that entrants cannot rely on an 
expansion of the market to accommodate them as prices are reduced, but are likely to 
have to fight against and replace incumbents. There is also likely to be considerable 
brand loyalty given the nature of the products. Customers may require compatibility 
with previously purchased weapons systems, or may provide follow-on orders from 
previous  contracts.  Barriers  to  exit  are  also  likely  to  remain  as  price  competition 
makes  the  civil  market  place  very  different  to  the  world  of  defence  companies. 
Defence  contracts  can  be  safe  and  profitable  and  often  involve  long-term 
commitments. The market is cyclical and even in lean spells it may be worth staying 
in the market in the expectation of better times, particularly as government is still 
likely to bail out major contractors in trouble. Furthermore, when there are cuts in 
domestic sales, governments are likely to provide assistance for foreign sales (Dunne 
and Surry 2006).  This suggests that the industrial component of the concept of an 
MIC  may  still  see  a  relative  stability  in  the  core  actors  –with  changes  on  the 
periphery. 
 
One  major  development  that  has  introduced  some  new  faces  is  the  significant 
expansion of the military services industry since the end of the cold war. This has 
been the result of the outsourcing of functions that once were provided by military 
forces or defence ministries to private companies and was expanded greatly during the 
war  in  Iraq  (Singer  2003;  Wulf  2005).  The  military  services  provided  by  private 
industry include not only the provision of armed security, the most publicized activity 
of  this  industry,  but  a  wide  range  of  other  services.  These  include  research  and 
analysis, various types of technical services—such as information technology, system 
support,  and  maintenance,  repair  and  overhaul  of  military  equipment—and 
operational support, including logistics and intelligence services.  While some of these 
services,  such  as  equipment  maintenance  have  been  an  integral  part  of  the  arms 
industry  for  a  longer  time,  the  expansion  has  seen  a  growth  in  the  number  of 
companies specializing in military services. This has been a significant change in the 
both the structure of the DIB, with new companies, such as KBR, previously owned   - 11 - 
by Halliburton, becoming a major DoD contractor for its provision of construction in 
conflict zones (Briody, 2004) and in the nature of the MIC, as companies providing 
military services are often engaged directly in conflict zones giving them a direct 
vested interest in the continuation of armed conflicts. In this way, their interests are 
different and more problematic than the vested interests of military goods-producing 
companies,  whose  products  are  also  in  high  demand  during  peace-time  (Perlo-
Freeman and Sköns 2008, 13).  
 
Military production has developed a very specific geographical distribution in most 
countries, as the location of factories and facilities has historically reflected security 
concerns  rather than just economic ones. This  has led to large defence dependent 
communities in various locations within any country with a large defence industry. 
The  changing  nature  of  the  industry  and  of  security  has  had  implications  for  the 
geographical  pattern  of  production  and  closures  cause  considerable  problems  for 
communities  as  often  the  jobs  lost  are  rather  different  to  those  available.  While 
evidence  suggests  that  defence  workers,  given  their  high  skills,  find  new  jobs 
relatively easily, it is usually lower-paid work and there is considerable disruption. 
The increased internationalisation of the supply chain also has implications for the 
geographical  distribution  of  production  and  employment,  reducing  the  major 
contractors’ impact on their traditional local economies. This can also impact upon 
local politicians interests in the defence budget (Dunne, 1995).  
 
 
5. European Dimensions 
 
The concept of an MIC was developed in the US and is most readily applied there. In 
the  post  Cold  War  world  the  process  of  restructuring  in  Europe  was  more 
complicated,  since  restructuring  necessarily  involved  cross-border  mergers,  which 
raised political issues. The major players in Europe also had quite different ownership 
structures, including a substantial degree of state ownership in France. Both factors 
made a financially-driven merger boom of the US type more difficult. Nonetheless, 
there was an increase in concentration and by 2005 the West European restructuring 
process  had  resulted  in  a  web  of  cross-border  ownership  and  collaboration 
relationships in aerospace and electronics. Concentration in the defence industry is 
still  not  as  high  as  in  comparable  high-tech  industries,  however,  suggesting  that 
market forces have not been allowed to work freely in the procurement, production 
and sales of weapon systems. This could also be the result of a segmentation of the 
arms industry with strong concentration in aerospace and electronics and less in other 
defence  industrial  sectors.  At  the  systems  level  in  aerospace  and  electronics 
oligopolistic tendencies are emerging at the international level, while in other sectors 
industry remains nationally fragmented (Dunne 2006b; Sköns 2005). 
 
In addition, the privatization of previously state-owned companies impacted on the 
integration  of  the  West  European  defence  industry  as  previously  state  controlled 
companies were forced to operate according to corporate business principles. The true 
impact on government influence and control is less clear, however, and differs across 
countries  depending  on  their  government’s  policy  towards  their  private  defence 
industry. What may turn out as being more important in the long run is the emergence 
of a security industry outside the traditional defence industry: the privatized military 
industry engaged in outsourced military services that has previously been provided   - 12 - 
within the military establishment, and the security industry engaged in the provision 
of  goods  and  services  for  personal  safety,  primarily  to  the  private  sector  but 
increasingly also to the government sector (Sköns 2005).  
 
In  the  UK  most  of  the  defence  industry  has  been  privatised,  while  in  the  rest  of 
Europe the state still owns much of the industry, but has been changing. Privatisation 
is taking place and the UK Government’s Public Private Partnerships (PPP) policy, 
launched in 2000, is having considerable influence. One part of this is the Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI), where the public sector contracts to purchase quality services 
on  a  long-term  basis  so  as  to  take  advantage  of  private-sector  management  skills 
which are stimulated and focused by having private finance at risk. PFI can include 
concessions and franchises, where a private-sector partner takes on the responsibility 
for providing a public service, including maintaining, enhancing or constructing the 
necessary infrastructure. This initiative is having an important impact  on relations 
between state and industry in the UK and is influencing government policy abroad 
(Dunne 2006b). 
 
In Europe, efforts were made to create both harmonisation of requirements (demand 
side) and a more open defence market (a ‘level playing field’) (supply side). The 
European Defence Agency (EDA) was created to help EU Member States develop 
their  defence  capabilities  for  crisis-management  operations  under  the  European 
Security and Defence Policy. It was intended to encourage EU governments to spend 
defence budgets on meeting future challenges, rather than past (Cold War) threats and 
to help identify  common needs and promote  collaboration. Article 296 of the EC 
Treaty,  restricts  cross-border  competition  by  allowing  Member  States  to  claim  an 
exemption on national security grounds from normal EU public procurement rules.  
The EDA Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement launched in 2006 deals with 
cases where exemptions are invoked, which has been the case for more than 50% of 
defence equipment purchases. It is intended to ensure that there is transparent and fair 
competition. In 2009 the European Parliament adopted a Directive to complement 
this, which recognises the specific features of the defence and security markets and 
which might lead to a weakening of competition. (Dunne 2006b; EDA website). 
 
All of these developments have led to a set of state-industry relations that look rather 
different to those of the old Cold War MIC, but they still suggest a dominant role for 
national governments and continuing close links between government, industry and 
the military.  In Europe privatisation has reduced direct state links, but indirect ones 
remain powerful, though in some ways less visible, as in the US. The structure of the 
MIC has changed and expanded, but its component parts would still seem to remain 
powerful lobbying groups in all countries (Dunne 2006b). 
 
 
6. Conclusions: Continuity and Change 
 
The concept of a Military Industrial Complex was a useful vehicle for understanding 
the  success  of  the  military  establishment  in  receiving  unprecedented  government 
budget allocations in the US and other advanced economies during the Cold War. It is 
a  problematic  concept  theoretically  but  retains  some  useful  descriptive  value,  in 
particular in assisting in an evaluation of the changes that have taken place since the 
end of the Cold War.     - 13 - 
 
What Eisenhower referred to as the MIC developed into a powerful and idiosyncratic 
structure,  with  strong  linkages  between  elements  within  the  military,  government, 
legislature, capital and labour and the dynamics of the Cold War provided justification 
for the unprecedented growth of military spending without any obvious change in 
threat. The Cold War defence industry is a very specific industry, its size, structure, 
trade  are  all  determined  by  government  policy  with  an  emphasis  on  performance 
rather  than  cost,  risk  borne  by  government,  elaborate  rules  and  regulations  on 
contracts,  and  close  relations  between  contractors,  procurement  executive  and 
military. As a result there were strong barriers to entry and barriers to exit, which led 
to the Cold War DIB showing remarkably stability in terms of its composition of main 
contractors.  
 
With the end of the Cold War there were a number of important developments that 
impacted upon the MIC. There were significant cuts in demand for arms, with the 
reductions  in  military  spending  and  trade.    Coupled  with  the  introduction  of 
competitive practices the power of the MIC in many countries was reduced. In the 
US,  however,  there  were  developments  that  went  against  the  trend,  with  military 
spending starting to grow again in 1999 and increase rapidly in 2001, with the ‘war on 
terror’. In addition, there were changes in the manner in which wars were funded, 
which  introduced  flexibility  to  arms  procurement  and  reduced  Congressional 
oversight. The result of this was to strengthen linkages between the military and the 
arms industry in the US.   
 
There were also changes in the nature of the demand in the arms market, with the 
have been changes in the demand side of the arms market, with the Revolution in 
Military Affairs (RMA) making communication and control technologies increasingly 
important  in  the  theatre  of  military  operations.  Strategic  concerns  shifted  to 
asymmetric warfare, with different implications for weapons systems required, while 
the growth of ‘homeland security’ also added new types of demand. In addition, the 
increasing involvement of NATO troops in peacekeeping roles has implications for 
force structures, arms and military systems requirements. The implications of these 
developments  for  the  industry  can  be  overstated.  There  is  still  lobbying  for  the 
maintenance of Cold War legacy systems – e.g. arguing that peacekeepers need the 
systems being developed and that NATO may face new superpowers, such as China, 
in future and it has had some success. 
 
The  end  of  the  Cold  War  did  not  bring  about  the  expected  diversification  of  the 
defence industry. Instead there was a rapid process of ownership concentration in the 
US through mergers and acquisitions.  This led to an increase in the size and power of 
the  major  defence  companies.    Increased  fixed  costs  in  production  led  to  arms 
producers  resorting  to  commercially  available  civilian  technologies  and  products, 
spin-in replaced spin-off and many areas of technology that were once the preserve of 
the  military  are  now  dominated  by  commercial  applications.  Subcontracting  has 
become increasingly important, bringing new types of company, particularly from the 
electronics  and  IT  sectors.  This  makes  it  has  become  less  clear  which  companies 
benefit from defence contracts, reducing the visibility of the defence industrial base.  
 
Within all major producing countries internationalisation of ownership  and supply 
chains took place. European producers sought US defence companies to try to break   - 14 - 
into the growing market, though only the UK was successful, and major producers 
sought component producers worldwide. Nevertheless companies remained dependent 
on their home government, regardless of ownership relations, but these developments 
did further reduce the visibility of the defence industrial base and in some cases led to 
governments and workers from other countries being involved in lobbying for orders 
 
A major reason for the relative stability of the cold war DIB was the existence of 
barriers to entry and exit. The industry has gone through changes, but barriers to entry 
are likely to remain considerable and this suggests that the industrial component of the 
concept of an MIC may still see a relative stability in the core actors –with changes on 
the periphery. One major source of new companies was the significant expansion of 
the military services industry since the end of the cold war. Companies have been 
providing  military  services  directly  in  conflict  zones  giving  them  a  direct  vested 
interest in the continuation of armed conflicts.  
 
Marked  changes  have  taken  place  in  Europe,  with  privatisation  and  EU  level 
legislation are changing the state industry relations, but their impact can be overstated. 
Certainly change is likely, but whether that is in the direction of a European –wide 
MIC is unclear. At present the transatlantic links would seem to be US-UK and while 
privatisation of European companies is changing the state-industry relations closer to 
that of the US, it is not clear that that will reduce their influence.   
 
Overall, it is clear that there has been considerable change in the nature and extent of 
the MIC but it is unclear exactly what the implications of this are.  The Defence 
Industrial Base has certainly seen some considerable restructuring and concentration 
worldwide, with increasing US dominance and US and European links developing. 
Old  arms  contractors  have  changed,  becoming  systems  integrators,  outsourcing 
nationally and internationally, spinning in civil technologies and components, rather 
than spinning off innovations for the civil sector. But despite some new players, the 
old specialist military companies remain dominant and are engaged in takeovers to 
acquire  expertise  in  new  areas.  There  is  little  evidence  to  suggest  that  the  links 
between the industry, the military, government and the legislator have weakened and 
it would still seem that it is a political rather than economic logic that controls the 
international arms market. Probably the best way to describe the changes that have 
taken place is that there has been change, but also a remarkable degree of continuity 
within the MIC. The concerns of Eisenhower are certainly still relevant as the post 
war restructuring may well have left an MIC that is just as pervasive and powerful, 
more varied, more internationally linked and less visible. 
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